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Abstract
We provide a conceptual map to navigate causal analysis problems. Focusing on the case of discrete
random variables, we consider the case of causal effect estimation from observational data. The
presented approaches apply also to continuous variables, but the issue of estimation becomes more
complex. We then introduce the four schools of thought for causal analysis 1.
1Parts of this document are copied verbatim from Lattimore [2018].
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1 Conceptual Map
Causal inference is an intuitively seductive phrase, and its use is often clouded in mystery. This doc-
ument provides a brief primer about the different kinds of problems that can be considered under the
umbrella of causal inference or causal analysis. Causal inference is often contrasted with statistical
or probabilistic inference, as captured by the phrase “correlation does not imply causation”. Vaguely
speaking causal inference is the study of adding an extra requirement to the definition of conditional
probability models, such that we can mathematically express the idea of a cause. For standard statis-
tical estimation (without an additional causal assumption), there are already challenges in estimating
conditional independence from data [Agresti, 2002, Zhang et al., 2018]. These challenges do not dis-
appear when considering causal models. It is worthwhile to also consider how we are planning to use
the results of causal analysis. According to Pearl and Mackenzie [2018] there are three levels on the
ladder of causation.
association Seeing and observing the environment.
Is the incidence of lung cancer higher among smokers?
intervention Doing and intervening in the environment.
How do we reduce lung cancer? What is the effect if we ban cigarettes?
counterfactuals Imagining, restrospection, understanding the environment.
What if I had not smoked for the last two years?
Before we introduce the four main mathematical models of causal analysis in Section 2, we briefly
discuss two other major dimensions for categorising causal inference. The first dimension (Section 1.1)
distinguishes between inferring of the graph of causes and using the graph of causes to infer the effect
of an action. An analogous problem exists also for non-causal statistical analysis, which distinguishes
between the choice of probabilistic model class and the parameters of the model. The second dimension,
which is unique to causal analysis, is the kind of data that we have available (Section 1.2). We may
wish to perform causal inference based on observational data or data we obtain after performing
interventions.
Given the challenges of performing causal inference, it is worth pointing out that in some sense
causality is “inevitable” if we find two dependent random variables.
Reichenbachs common cause principle If two random variables X and Y are statistically de-
pendent (X 6⊥ Y ), then there exists a third variable Z that causally influences both [Peters et al.,
2017]. As a special case, Z may coincide with either X or Y . Furthermore, this variable Z screens X
and Y from each other in the sense that given Z, they become independent, X ⊥ Y |Z. In practice,
several other reasons can give rise to dependence: There may be unobserved causes, also known as
selection bias; the discovery of dependence from data might be false due to performing multiple hy-
pothesis testing; there may be a common time dependence, for example both variables are growing
exponentially.
1.1 Structure discovery vs effect estimation
Analogous to the distinction between the design choice of a class of probabilistic models and the
computation of their maximum likelihood parameters, there are two types of causal analysis problems.
First we may wish to discover the graph of causes from a set of data. Second given the graph, we
may wish to the effect of intervening on a node in the graph. Another way of stating the distinction
is to consider whether we are thinking about forward or reverse causal effects [Gelman and Imbens,
2013]. The forward direction considers the problem of estimating the effect of a given intervention,
and is akin to estimating the causal strength of an edge in the graph. The reverse direction considers
the problem of estimating the cause of a particular observation. The reverse direction causal analysis
is similar to causal graph discovery as one would need to estimate which other random variable (from
the set of all random variables) caused the effect.
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1.1.1 Discovering causal graphs
Causal discovery is the attempt to learn the structure of the causal relationships between variables,
on which there is a rich literature, see Spirtes and Zhang [2016] for a recent review. We may be
interested in discovering a causal graph from a set of known models. This arises naturally if we
assume free access to a large observational data set, from which the Markov equivalence class can be
found via causal discovery techniques. Work on the problem of selecting experiments to discover the
correct causal graph from within a Markov equivalence class [Eberhardt et al., 2005, Eberhardt, 2010,
Hauser and Bu¨hlmann, 2014, Hu et al., 2014] could potentially be incorporated into a causal bandit
algorithm. In particular, Hu et al. [2014] show that only O (log log n) multi-variable interventions are
required on average to recover a causal graph over n variables once purely observational data is used
to recover the “essential graph”.
1.1.2 Effect estimation
Given a causal graph, estimating the strength of causality is similar to estimating the effect size in
standard regression analysis [Gelman and Hill, 2006]. As we will see in Section 2.3, we can consider
the problem of counterfactual reasoning in terms of two distinct conditional probability estimation
tasks. It turns out that these tasks are related (one factual and the second counterfactual) and tools
from domain adaptation can be used for estimation [Johansson et al., 2016].
1.2 Observation vs Intervention
In contrast to standard statistical analysis based on observational data, causal analysis benefits from
data that is collected after performing an intervention on the system of interest. One experimental
design that allows us to study causal effects is the randomised control trial.
1.2.1 Learning from observational data
The goal of causal inference is to learn the effect of taking an action. We can do this directly via
experimental approaches, however any given agent only has a limited capacity to manipulate the
world. We are generating and storing data on almost every aspect of our lives at an unprecedented
rate. As we incorporate sensors and robotics into our cities, homes, cars, everyday products and even
our bodies, the breadth and scale of this data will only increase. However, only a tiny fraction of
this data will be generated in a controlled way with the specific goal of answering a single question.
An agent that can only learn from data when it had explicit control (or perfect knowledge of) the
process by which that data was generated will be severely limited. This makes it critical that we
develop effective methods that enable us to predict the outcome of an intervention in some system by
observing, rather than acting on it. This is the problem of observational causal inference. The key
feature that distinguishes observational from interventional data is that the learning agent does not
control the action about which they are trying to learn.
1.2.2 Learning from interventions
The previous section focused on aspects of the problem of estimating the likely effect of an intervention
from data gathered prior to making the intervention. There is an obvious alternative. Instead of
trying to infer the outcome of an intervention from passive observations, one can intervene and see
what happens. There are three key differences between observing a system and explicitly intervening
in it. First, we determine the nature of the intervention and thereby control the data points used
to estimate causal effects. Selecting data points optimally for learning is the focus of the optimal
experimental design literature within statistics [Pukelsheim, 2006] and the active learning literature in
machine learning [Settles, 2010]. Secondly, explicitly choosing interventions yields a perfect model of
the probability with which each action is selected, given any context, allowing control over confounding
bias. Finally, when we are intervening in a system we typically care about the impact of our actions
on the system in addition to optimising learning. For example, in a drug trial, assigning people a sub-
optimal treatment has real world costs. This leads to a trade-off between exploiting the best known
3
Treatment
Randomiser
Outcome
U
Figure 1: causal network for a randomised experiment
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Figure 2: causal network for a stratified randomised experiment if the probability an individual is
assigned a given treatment depends on some covariates.
action so far and exploring alternative actions about which we are less certain. This exploration-
exploitation trade-off lies at the heart of the field of reinforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998].
1.3 Randomised experiments
Randomised controlled trials are often presented as the gold standard for determining causal effects.
What is it about randomisation that makes it so important when it comes to causality? The graphical
model for a randomised controlled experiment is shown in figure 1. If we assume perfect compliance
(everyone takes the treatment that we select for them) then we have a perfect model for the treatment
assignment process. Since treatment is assigned randomly, there can be no other variables that
influence it and thus no confounding variables that affect both treatment and outcome.
Randomisation does not ensure target and control group are exactly alike. The more other features
(observed or latent) influence the outcome, the more likely it is that there will be a significant difference
in the joint distribution of these variables between the target and control groups in a finite data sample.
However, the variance in the outcome, within both the target and control groups, also increases. The
net result is increased variance (but not bias) in the estimate of causal effects.
Stratified randomised experiments address the issue of variance due to covariate imbalance by
randomly allocating treatment conditional on covariates believed to influence the outcome of interest.
If we stratify in such a way that the probability an instance receives a given treatment is independent
of its covariates, for example, by grouping instances by each assignment to the covariates and then
assigning treatment randomly with fixed probabilities, the causal graphical model in figure 1 still
holds. We can then estimate the average causal effects directly from the differences in outcome across
treatments. More complex stratification strategies can introduce a backdoor path from treatment to
outcome via the covariates on which treatment is stratified, (figure 2). This necessitates that one
condition on these covariates in computing the average causal effect in the same way as for estimating
causal effects under ignorability. The key difference is that the propensity score is known, as it
is designed by the experimenter, and there are guaranteed (rather than assumed) to be no latent
confounding variables (that influence both treatment and outcome). See Imbens and Rubin [2015] for
a discussion of the trade-offs between stratified versus completely random experiments.
The benefit provided by randomisation in breaking the link between the treatment variable and
any latent confounders should not be understated. The possibility of unobserved confounders cannot
be empirically ruled out from observational data [Pearl, 2000] (there is no test for confounding).
This means causal estimates from non-experimental data are always subject to the criticism that an
important confounder may have been overlooked or not properly adjusted for. However, randomised
experiments do have some limitations.
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Figure 3: causal network for a randomised experiment with imperfect compliance
1.4 Limitations of randomised experiments
The idealised notion of an experiment represented by figure 1 does not capture the complexities of
randomised experiments in practice. There may be imperfect compliance so that the treatment selected
by the randomiser is not always followed, or output censoring in which the experimenter is not able
to observe the outcome for all units (for example if people drop out). If compliance or attrition is
not random, but associated with (potentially latent) variables that also affect the outcome, then the
problem of confounding bias returns.2 See figure 3 for a graphical model of a randomised experiment
with imperfect compliance.
It is not always possible or ethical to conduct a randomised controlled trial, as is beautifully
demonstrated by the paper of Smith and Pell [2003] on randomised cross-over trials of parachute use
for the reduction of the mortality and morbidity associated with falls from large heights. When
experimentation is possible, it is frequently difficult or expensive. This means experimental data sets
are often much smaller than observational ones, limiting the complexity of models that can be explored.
In addition, they are often conducted on a convenient, but unrepresentative, sample of the broader
population of interest (for example first year university students). This can result in estimates with
high internal validity [Campbell et al., 1963], in that they should replicate well in a similar population,
but low external validity in that the results may not carry over to the general population of interest.
The question of whether an experiment conducted on one population can be mapped to another is
referred to as the transportability problem [Bareinboim and Pearl, 2013] and relies on very similar
assumptions and arguments to causal inference and the do-calculus.
Finally, non-adaptive randomised experiments are not optimal from either an active or reinforce-
ment learning perspective. In fact it is becoming increasingly common for adaptive clinical trials to
be used as a study design [Bothwell et al., 2018]. As an experiment proceeds, information is obtained
about the expectation and variance of each intervention (or treatment). Fixed experimental designs
cannot make use of this information to select which intervention to try next. This results in both
poorer estimates for a fixed number of experimental samples and more sub-optimal actions during the
course of the experiment.
2 Four schools of causality
In this section, we consider limit the discussion to the case where we already know the causal graph and
are only interested in estimating the causal effect from observational data. To simplify the presentation
we only consider discrete random variables with finite number of states.
Observational causal inference aims to infer the outcome of an intervention in some system from
data obtained by observing (but not intervening on) it. As previously mentioned, this is a form of
transfer learning; we need to infer properties of the system post-intervention from observations of the
2Non-compliance is a problem if the goal is to estimate the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome but not
if the goal is to estimate the causal effect of prescribing the treatment. The latter makes sense in a context where the
process by which people decide whether to take the treatment they have been prescribed is likely to be the same if the
treatment were made available more generally beyond the experimental trial.
5
system pre-intervention. Mapping properties from one system to another requires some assumptions
about how these two systems are related, or in other words, a way of describing actions and how
we anticipate a system will respond to them. Three key approaches have emerged: counterfactuals,
structural equation models and causal Bayesian networks.
Counterfactuals [Rubin, 1974] were developed from the starting point of generalising from ran-
domised trials to less controlled settings. They describe causal effects in terms of differences between
counterfactual variables, what would happen if we took one action versus what would happen if we
took another. Counterfactual assertions can be expressed very naturally in human languages and are
prevalent in everyday conversations; “if I had worked harder I would have got better grades” and “she
would have been much sicker if she hadn’t taken antibiotics”. Structural equation models have been
developed and applied primarily within economics and related disciplines. They can be seen as an at-
tempt to capture key aspects of the people’s behaviour with mathematics. Questions around designing
policies or interventions play a central role in economics. Thus they have transformed simultaneous
equations into a powerful framework and associated set of methods for estimating causal effects. The
is also a rich strand of work on using the assumptions that can be encoded in structural equation
models, also known as functional causal models to discover the structure and direction of causal re-
lationships - see for example Mooij et al. [2016]. Causal Bayesian networks [Pearl, 2000] are a more
recent development and arise from the addition of a fundamental assumption about the meaning of a
link to Bayesian networks. They inherit and leverage the way Bayesian networks encode conditional
independencies between variables to localise the impact of an intervention in a system in a way that
allows formalisation of the conditions under which causal effects can be inferred from observational
data.
However, the literature on causal inference techniques remains split between the different frame-
works. Much of the recent work on estimating causal effects within machine learning, as well as
widely used methodologies such as propensity scoring, are described using the counterfactual frame-
work. Methods developed within economics, in particular instrumental variable based approaches,
or those requiring parametric or functional assumptions, are often based around structural equation
models. This makes it worthwhile for researchers interested in causality to develop an understanding
of all these viewpoints.
In the next sections, we describe causal Bayesian networks, counterfactuals and structural equation
models: the problems they allow us to solve, the assumptions they rely on and how they differ. By
describing all three frameworks, how they relate to one-another, and when they can be viewed as
equivalent, we will make it easier for researchers familiar with one framework to understand the
others and to transfer ideas and techniques between them. In order to demonstrate the notation and
formalisms each framework provides, we will use them to describe the following simple examples.
Example 1. Suppose a pharmaceutical company wants to assess the effectiveness of a new drug on
recovery from a given illness. This is typically tested by taking a large group of representative patients
and randomly assigning half of them to a treatment group (who receive the drug) and the other half
to a control group (who receive a placebo). The goal is to determine the clinical impacts of the drug
by comparing the differences between the outcomes for the two groups (in this case, simplified to only
two outcomes - recovery or non-recovery). We will use the variable X (1 = drug, 0 = placebo) to
represent the treatment each person receives and Y (1 = recover, 0 = not recover) to describe the
outcome.
Example 2. Suppose we want to estimate the impact on high school graduation rates of compulsory
preschool for all four year olds. We have a large cross-sectional data set on a group of twenty year olds
that records if they attended preschool, if they graduated high school and their parents socio-economic
status (SES). We will let X ∈ {0, 1} indicate if an individual attended preschool, Y ∈ {0, 1} indicate
if they graduated high school and Z ∈ {0, 1} represent if they are from a low or high SES background
respectively.3
3There has been substantial empirical work on the effectiveness of early childhood education including a landmark
randomised trial, the Perry Preschool project, which ran from 1962-1967 [Weikart and Others, 1970].
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2.1 Causal Bayesian networks
Causal Bayesian networks are an extension of Bayesian networks. A Bayesian network is a graphical
way of representing how a distribution factorises. Any joint probability distribution can be factorised
into a product of conditional probabilities. There are multiple valid factorisations, corresponding to
permutations of variable ordering.
P (X1,X2,X3, ...) = P (X1)P (X2|X1)P (X3|X1,X2)... (1)
We can represent this graphically by drawing a network with a node for each variable and adding
links from the variables on the right hand side to the variable on the left for each conditional probability
distribution, see figure 4. If the factorisation simplifies due to conditional independencies between
variables, this is reflected by missing edges in the corresponding network. There are multiple valid
Bayesian network representations for any probability distribution over more than one variable, see
figure 5 for an example.
X1
X2 X3
Figure 4: A general Bayesian network for the joint distribution over three variables. This network
does not encode any conditional independencies between its variables and can thus represent any
distribution over three variables.
The statement that a given graph G is a Bayesian network for a distribution P tells us that the
distribution can be factorised over the nodes and edges in the graph. There can be no missing edges
in G that do not correspond to conditional independencies in P , (the converse is not true: G can have
extra edges). If we let Pa(Xi) represent the set of variables that are parents of the variable Xi in G
then we can write the joint distribution as;
P (X1, ...,XN ) =
∏
i=1...N
P (Xi|Pa(Xi)) (2)
A causal Bayesian network is a Bayesian network in which a link Xi → Xj , by definition, implies
Xi causes Xj . This means an intervention to change the value of Xi can be expected to affect Xj , but
interventions on Xj will not affect Xi. We need some notation to describe interventions and represent
distributions over variables in the network after an intervention. We use the do operator introduced
by Pearl [Pearl, 2000].
Definition 1. The do-notation
• do(X = x) denotes an intervention that sets the random variable(s) X to x.
• P (Y |do(X)) is the distribution of Y conditional on an intervention that sets X. This notation
is somewhat overloaded. It may be used to represent a probability distribution/mass function or
a family of distribution functions depending on whether the variables are discrete or continuous
and whether or not we are treating them as fixed. For example, it could represent
– the probability P (Y = 1|do(X = x)) as a function of x,
– the probability mass function for a discrete Y : P (Y |do(X = x)),
– the probability density function for a continuous Y : fY (y|do(X = x)),
– a family of density/mass function for Y parameterised by x.
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(a)
X1
X2
X3
(b)
X1
X2
X3
(c)
X2
X1 X3
(d)
X2
X1 X3
Figure 5: Some valid Bayesian networks for a distribution P over (X1,X2,X3) in which X3 is condi-
tionally independent of X1 given X2, denoted X3 ⊥ X1|X2. Graphs (a), (b) and (c) are all a perfect
map for P as the graphical structure implies exactly the same set of independencies exhibited by the
distribution. Graph (d), like figure 4 does not imply any conditional independencies, and is thus a
valid (but not very useful) Bayesian network representation for any distribution over three variables.
Where the distinction is important and not clear from context we will use one of the more specific
forms above.
Theorem 2 (Truncated product formula [Pearl, 2000]). If G is a causal network for a distribution
P defined over variables X1...XN , then we can calculate the distribution after an intervention where
we set Z ⊂ X to z, denoted do(Z = z) by dropping the terms for each of the variables in Z from the
factorisation given by the network. Let Pa(Xi) denote the parents of the variable Xi in G.
P (X1...XN |do(Z = z)) = 1{Z = z}
∏
Xi /∈Z
P (Xi|Pa(Xi)) (3)
Theorem 2 does not hold for standard Bayesian networks because there are multiple valid networks
for the same distribution. The truncated product formula will give different results depending on the
selected network. The result is possible with causal Bayesian networks because it follows directly from
the assumption that the direction of the link indicates causality. In fact, from the interventionist
viewpoint of causality, the truncated product formula defines what it means for a link to be causal.
Returning to example 1, and phrasing our query in terms of interventions; what would the distri-
bution of outcomes look like if everyone was treated P (Y |do(X = 1)), relative to if no one was treated
P (Y |do(X = 0))? The treatment X is a potential cause of Y , along with other unobserved variables,
such as the age, gender and the disease subtype of the patient. Since X is assigned via deliberate ran-
domisation, it cannot be affected by any latent variables. The causal Bayesian network for this scenario
is shown in figure 6. This network represents the (causal) factorisation P (X,Y ) = P (X) P (Y |X),
so from equation (3), P (Y |do(X)) = P (Y |X). In this example, the interventional distribution is
equivalent to the observational one.
X (Treatment) Y (Outcome)
Figure 6: Causal Bayesian network for example 1
In example 2 we are interested in P (Y |do(X = 1)), the expected high-school graduation rate if
we introduce universal preschool. We could compare it to outlawing preschool P (Y |do(X = 0)) or
the current status quo P (Y ). It seems reasonable to assume that preschool attendance affects the
likelihood of high school graduation 4 and that parental socio-economic status would affect both the
4The effect does not have to be homogeneous, it may depend non-linearly on characteristics of the child, family and
school.
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Z (SES)
X (Pre-school) Y (Graduated)
Figure 7: Causal Bayesian network for example 2
likelihood of preschool attendance and high school graduation. If we assume that socio-economic status
is the only such variable (nothing else affects both attendance and graduation), we can represent this
problem with the causal Bayesian network in figure 7. In this case, the interventional distribution is
not equivalent to the observational one. If parents with high socio-economic status are more likely to
send their children to preschool and these children are more likely to graduate high school regardless,
comparing the graduation rates of those who attended preschool with those who did not will overstate
the benefit of preschool. To obtain the interventional distribution we have to estimate the impact
of preschool on high school graduation for each socio-economic level separately and then weight the
results by the proportion of the population in that group,
P (Y |do(X = 1)) =
∑
z∈Z
P (Y |X = 1, Z) P (Z) (4)
We have seen from these two examples that the expression to estimate the causal effect of an
intervention depends on the structure of the causal graph. There is a very powerful and general set
of rules that specifies how we can transform observational distributions into interventional ones for a
given graph structure. These rules are referred to as the Do-calculus [Pearl, 2000].
A causal Bayesian network represents much more information than a Bayesian network with iden-
tical structure. A causal network encodes all possible interventions that could be specified with the
do-notation. For example, if the network in figure 7 were an ordinary Bayesian network and all
the variables were binary, the associated distribution could be described by seven parameters. The
equivalent causal Bayesian network additionally represents the post-interventional distributions for
six possible single variable interventions and twelve possible two variable interventions. Encoding all
this information without the assumptions implicit in the causal Bayesian network would require an
additional thirty parameters.5
Causal Bayesian networks are Bayesian networks, so results that apply to Bayesian networks carry
directly across: the local Markov property states that variables are independent of their non-effects
given their direct causes. The global Markov property and d-separation also hold in causal networks.
D-separation, which characterises which conditional independencies must hold in any distribution that
can be represented by a given Bayesian network G, is key to many important results and algorithms
for causal inference.
2.2 Limitations of causal Bayesian networks
A number of criticisms have been levelled at this approach to modelling causality. One is that the
definition of an intervention only in terms of setting the value of one or more variables is too precise
and that any real world intervention will affect many variables in complex and non-deterministic ways
[Rickles, 2009, Cartwright, 2007]. However, by augmenting the causal graph with additional variables
that model how interventions may take effect, the deterministic do operator can model more complex
interventions. For example, in the drug treatment case, we assumed that all subjects complied, taking
the treatment or placebo as assigned by the experimenter. But, what if some people failed to take
the prescribed treatment? We can model this within the framework of deterministic interventions
5After each single variable intervention we have a distribution over two variables, which can be represented by three
parameters. After each two variable intervention, we have a distribution over one variable which requires one parameter.
This takes us to a total of 6× 3 + 12× 1 = 30 additional parameters.
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by adding a node representing what they were prescribed (the intervention) which probabilistically
influences the treatment they actually receive (figure 8). Note that the fact that we no longer directly
assign the treatment opens the possibility that an unobserved latent variable could affect both the
actual treatment taken and the outcome.
Prescribed Treatment
Actual Treatment Outcome
U
Figure 8: Randomised treatment with imperfect compliance
Another key issue with causal Bayesian networks is that they cannot handle cyclic dependencies
between variables. Such feedback loops are common in real-life systems, for example the relationship
between supply and demand in economics or predator and prey in ecology. We might regard the
underlying causal mechanisms in these examples to be acyclic; the number of predators at one time
influences the number of prey in the next period and so on. However, if our measurements of these
variables must be aggregated over time periods that are longer than the scale at which these interac-
tions occur, the result is a cyclical dependency. Even were we able to measure on shorter timescales,
there might then not be sufficient data on each variable for inference. Such problems have mostly been
studied within the dynamical systems literature, typically focusing on understanding the stationary or
equilibrium state of the system and making very specific assumptions about functional form in order
to make problems tractable. Poole and Crowley [2013] compare the equilibrium approach to reasoning
about cyclic problems with structural equation models, which we discuss in section 2.4 and that can
be seen as Bayesian causal networks with additional functional assumptions.
2.3 Counterfactuals
The Neyman-Rubin model [Rubin, 1974, 1978, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, Rubin, 2005, 2008] de-
fines causality in terms of potential outcomes, or counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are statements
about imagined or alternate realities, are prevalent in everyday language and may play a role in the
development of causal reasoning in humans [Weisberg and Gopnik, 2013]. Causal effects are differ-
ences in counterfactual variables: what the difference is between what would have happened if we did
one thing versus what would have happened if we did something else.
In example 1, the causal effect of the drug relative to placebo for person i is the difference between
what would have happened if they were given the drug, denoted yi
1 versus what would have happened
if they got the placebo, yi
0. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we can only observe
one of these two outcomes, since a given person can only be treated or not treated. The problem can
be resolved if, instead of people, there are units that can be assumed to be identical or that will revert
exactly to their initial state some time after treatment. This type of assumption often holds to a good
approximation in the natural sciences and explains why researchers in these fields are less concerned
with causal theory.
Putting aside any estimates of individual causal effects, it is possible to learn something about
the distributions under treatment or placebo. Let Y 1 be a random variable representing the potential
outcome if treated. The distribution of Y 1 is the distribution of Y if everyone was treated. Similarly Y 0
represents the potential outcome for the placebo. The difference between the probability of recovery,
across the population, if everyone was treated and the probability of recovery if everyone received the
placebo is P
(
Y 1
)
− P
(
Y 0
)
. We can estimate (from an experimental or observational study):
• P (Y = 1|X = 1), the probability that those who took the treatment will recover
• P (Y = 1|X = 0), the probability that those who were not treated will recover
Now, for those who took the treatment, the outcome had they taken the treatment Y 1 is the same
as the observed outcome. For those who did not take the treatment, the observed outcome is the same
as the outcome had they not taken the treatment. Equivalently stated:
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P
(
Y 0|X = 0
)
= P(Y |X = 0)
P
(
Y 1|X = 1
)
= P(Y |X = 1)
If we assume X ⊥ Y 0 and X ⊥ Y 1:
P
(
Y 1
)
= P
(
Y 1|X = 1
)
= P(Y |X = 1)
P
(
Y 0
)
= P
(
Y 0|X = 0
)
= P(Y |X = 0)
This implies the counterfactual distributions are equivalent to the corresponding conditional dis-
tributions and, for a binary outcome Y , the causal effect is,
P
(
Y 1
)
− P
(
Y 0
)
= P(Y |X = 1)− P (Y |X = 0)
The assumptionsX ⊥ Y 1 andX ⊥ Y 0 are referred to as ignorability assumptions [Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983]. They state that the treatment each person receives is independent of whether they would re-
cover if treated and if they would recover if not treated. This is justified in example 1 due to the
randomisation of treatment assignment. In general the treatment assignment will not be independent
of the potential outcomes. In example 2, the children from wealthy families could be more likely to
attend preschool but also more likely to do better in school regardless, i.e X 6⊥ Y 0 and X 6⊥ Y 1. A
more general form of the ignorability assumption is to identify a set of variables Z such that X ⊥ Y 1|Z
and X ⊥ Y 0|Z.
Theorem 3 (Ignorability [Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, Pearl, 2000]). If X ⊥ Y 1|Z and X ⊥ Y 0|Z,
P
(
Y 1
)
=
∑
z∈Z
P (Y |X = 1, Z) P (Z) (5)
P
(
Y 0
)
=
∑
z∈Z
P (Y |X = 0, Z) P (Z) (6)
Assuming that within each socio-economic status level, attendance at preschool is independent of
the likelihood of graduating high-school had a person attended, then the average rate of high-school
graduation given a universal preschool program can be computed from equation 5. Note, that this
agrees with the weighted adjustment formula in equation 4.
Another assumption introduced within the Neyman-Rubin causal framework is the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) [Rubin, 1978]. This is the assumption that the potential
outcome for one individual (or unit) does not depend on the treatment assigned to another individual.
As an example of a SUTVA violation, suppose disadvantaged four year olds were randomly assigned to
attend preschool. The subsequent school results of children in the control group, who did not attend,
could be boosted by the improved behaviour of those who did and who now share the classroom
with them. SUTVA violations would manifest as a form of model misspecification in causal Bayesian
networks.
There are objections to counterfactuals arising from the way they describe alternate universes that
were never realised. In particular, statements involving joint distributions over counterfactual variables
may not be able to be validated empirically Dawid [2000]. One way of looking at counterfactuals is
as a natural language short hand for describing highly specific interventions like those denoted by
the do-notation. Rather than talking about the distribution of Y given we intervene to set X = x
and hold everything else about the system constant we just say what would the distribution of Y be
had X been x. This is certainly convenient, if rather imprecise. However, the ease with which we
can make statements with counterfactuals that cannot be tested with empirical data warrants careful
attention. It is important to be clear what assumptions are being made and whether or not they could
be validated (at least in theory).
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2.4 Structural Equation models
Structural equation models (SEMs) describe a deterministic world, where some underlying mechanism
or function determines the output of any process for a given input. The mechanism (but not the
output) is assumed to be independent of what is fed into it. Uncertainties are not inherent but
arise from unmeasured variables. Linear structural equation models have a long history for causal
estimation Wright [1921], Haavelmo [1943]. More recently, they have been formalised, generalised to
the non-linear setting and connected to developments in graphical models to provide a powerful causal
framework [Pearl, 2000].
Mathematically, each variable is a deterministic function of its direct causes and a noise term that
captures unmeasured variables. The noise terms are required to be mutually independent. If there is
the possibility that an unmeasured variable influences more than one variable of interest in a study,
it must be modelled explicitly as a latent variable. Structural equation models can be represented
visually as a network. Each variable is a node and arrows are drawn from causes to their effects.
Figure 9 illustrates the SEM for example 1.
X = fx(ǫx) Y = fy(X, ǫy)
ǫyǫx
Figure 9: SEM for example 1
This model encodes the assumption that the outcome yi for an individual i is caused solely by the
treatment xi they receive and other factors ǫyi that are independent of X. This is justifiable on the
grounds that X is random. The outcome of a coin flip for each patient should not be related to any
of their characteristics (hidden or otherwise). Note that the causal graph in figure 9 is identical to
that of the Bayesian network for the same problem (figure 6). The latent variables ǫx and ǫy are not
explicitly drawn in figure 6 as they are captured by the probabilistic nature of the nodes in a Bayesian
network.
Taking the action X = 1 corresponds to replacing the equation X = fx(ǫx) with X = 1. The
function fy and distribution over ǫy does not change. This results in the interventional distribution,
6
P (Y = y|do(X = 1)) =
∑
ǫy
P (ǫy)1{fy(1, ǫy) = y} (7)
The observational distribution of Y given X is,
P (Y = y|X = 1) =
∑
ǫx
∑
ǫy
P (ǫx|X = 1)P (ǫy|ǫx)1{fy(1, ǫy) = y} (8)
=
∑
ǫy
P (ǫy)1{fy(1, ǫy) = y} , as ǫx ⊥ ǫy (9)
The interventional distribution is the same as the observational one. The same argument applies
to the intervention do(X = 0), and so the causal effect is simply the difference in observed outcomes
as found via the causal Bayesian network and counterfactual approaches.
The SEM for example 2 is shown in figure 10. Intervening to send all children to preschool replaces
the equation X = fx(Z, ǫx) with X = 1, leaving all the other functions and distributions in the model
unchanged.
6We have assumed the variables are discrete only for notational convenience
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P (Y = y|do(X = 1)) =
∑
z
∑
ǫy
P (z) P (ǫy)1{fy(1, z, ǫy) = y} (10)
=
∑
z
P (z)
∑
ǫy
P (ǫy)1{fy(1, z, ǫy) = y}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(Y=y|X=1,Z=z)
(11)
Equation 11 corresponds to equations 4 and 5. It is not equivalent to the observational distribution
given by:
P (Y = y|X = 1) =
∑
z
∑
ǫy
P (z|X = 1)P (ǫy)1{fy(1, z, ǫy) = y} (12)
X = fx(Z, ǫx)
Z = fz(ǫz)
ǫz
Y = fy(X,Z, ǫy)
ǫyǫx
Figure 10: SEM for example 2
Structural equation models are generally applied with strong constraints on the functional form
of the relationship between the variables and noise, which is typically assumed to be additive, Xi =
fi(·) + ǫi. A structural equation model with N variables resembles a set of N simultaneous equations,
with each variable playing the role of the dependent (left hand side) variable in one equation. However
a SEM is, by definition, more than a set of simultaneous equations. By declaring it to be structural,
we are saying that it represents causal assumptions about the relationships between variables. When
visualised as a network, the absence of an arrow between two variables encodes the assumption that one
does not cause the other. The similarity between the notation used to describe and analyse structural
equation models and simultaneous equations, combined with a reluctance to make explicit statements
about causality, has led to some confusion in the interpretation of SEMs [Heckman and Pinto, 2015,
Pearl, 2000].
2.5 Comparing and unifying the models
Remarkably for models developed relatively independently in fields with very different approaches and
problems, causal Bayesian networks, counterfactuals and structural equation models can be nicely
unified for interventional queries (those that can be expressed with the do-notation) [Pearl, 2000].
These queries, and the assumptions required to answer them, can be mapped between the frameworks
in a straightforward way, allowing techniques developed within one framework to be immediately
applied within another. If the network for a structural equation model is acyclic, that is if starting
from any node and following edges in the direction of the arrows you cannot return to the starting
point, then it implies a recursive factorisation of the joint distribution over its variables. In other
words, the network is a causal Bayesian network. All of the results that apply to causal Bayesian
networks also apply to acyclic structural equation models. Taking an action that sets a variable to a
specific value equates to replacing the equation for that variable with a constant. This corresponds
to dropping a term in the factorisation and the truncated product formula (equation 3). Thus, the
interventional query P (Y |do(X)) is identical in these two frameworks. We can also connect this to
counterfactuals via:
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P
(
Y 0
)
≡ P (Y |do(X = 0))
P
(
Y 1
)
≡ P (Y |do(X = 1))
(13)
The assumption ǫX ⊥ ǫY , stated for our structural equation model, translates to X ⊥ (Y
0, Y 1)
in the language of counterfactuals. When discussing the counterfactual model, we made the slightly
weaker assumption:
X ⊥ Y 0 and X ⊥ Y 1 (14)
It is possible to relax the independence of errors assumption for SEMs to correspond exactly with
the form of equation (14) without losing any of the power provided by d-separation and graphical
identification rules [Richardson and Robins, 2013]. The correspondence between the models for inter-
ventional queries (those that can be phrased using the do-notation) makes it straightforward to com-
bine key results and algorithms developed within any of these frameworks. For example, you can draw
a causal graphical network to determine if a problem is identifiable and which variables should be ad-
justed for to obtain an unbiased causal estimate. Then use propensity scores [Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983] to estimate the effect. If non-parametric assumptions are insufficient for identification or lead to
overly large uncertainties, you can specify additional assumptions by phrasing your model in terms of
structural equations. The frameworks do differ when it comes to causal queries that involve joint or
nested counterfactuals and cannot be expressed with the do-notation. These types of queries arise in
the study of mediation [Pearl, 2014, Imai et al., 2010, VanderWeele and Herna´ndez-Diaz, 2011] and in
legal decisions, particularly on issues such as discrimination [Pearl, 2000]. The graphical approach to
representing causal knowledge can be extended to cover these types of questions via Single World In-
tervention Graphs [Richardson and Robins, 2013], which explicitly represent counterfactual variables
in the graph.
In practice, differences in focus and approach between the fields in which each model dominates
eclipse the actual differences in the frameworks. The work on causal graphical models [Pearl, 2000,
Spirtes et al., 2000] focuses on asymptotic, non-parametric estimation and rigorous theoretical foun-
dations. The Neyman-Rubin framework builds on the understanding of randomised experiments and
generalises to quasi-experimental and observational settings, with a particular focus on non-random
assignment to treatment. Treatment variables are typically discrete (often binary). This research
emphasises estimation of average causal effects and provides practical methods for estimation, in par-
ticular, propensity scores; a method to control for multiple variables in high dimensional settings with
finite data [Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983]. In economics, inferring causal effects from non-experimental
data to support policy decisions is central to the field. Economists are often interested in more in-
formative measures of the distribution of causal effects than the mean and make extensive use of
structural equation models, generally with strong parametric assumptions [Heckman, 2008]. The cen-
tral approach to estimation is regression - which naturally handles continuous variables while discrete
variables are typically encoded as indicator variables. In addition, the parametric structural equation
models favoured in economics can be extended to analyse cyclic (otherwise referred to as non-recursive)
models. However, these differences are not fundamental to the frameworks. Functional assumptions
can be specified on the conditional distributions of (causal) Bayesian networks, counterfactuals can
readily represent continuous treatments (eg Y x), and structural equation models can represent complex
non-linear relationships between both continuous and discrete variables.
2.6 Granger causality
A discussion of approaches to (observational) causal inference would not be complete without a mention
of Granger causality, [Granger, 1969]. The fundamental idea behind Granger causality is to leverage
the assumption that the future does not cause the past to test the existence and direction of a causal
link between two time series. The basic approach is to test, for a pair of time series variables X and
Y , if Yt ⊥ (X1, ...,Xt−1)|(Y1, ..., Yt−1) - that is if the history of X helps to predict Y given the history
of Y . The original formulation considered only pairs of variables and linear causal relationships but
recent work has generalised the key idea to multiple variables and non-linear relationships. Unlike the
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previous models we have discussed, Granger causality does not provide us with a means to specify our
assumptions about the causal structure between variables. Rather it aims to infer the causal structure
of a structural equation model from observational data - subject to some assumptions. In some sense,
Granger causality is closer to standard prediction tasks in machine learning than causal analysis.
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